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Making IT Matter:
A Manager’s Guide to Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantage 
with Information Systems
By Gabriele Piccoli
(5) Evaluate how to exploit the characteristics of 
the IT development and implementation life 
cycle to estimate the extent of response lag as 
competitors attempt to imitate the initiative;
(6) Evaluate how to exploit the characteristics 
of the value system in which their firm is 
embedded to preempt competitors’ response 
and create obstacles to replication; and
(7) Evaluate the evolutionary paths available 
to the firm to reinforce barriers to erosion 
of competitive advantage associated with 
IT-dependent strategic initiatives.  
This report offers a framework that can help 
managers formally analyze existing and proposed 
IT-dependent strategic initiatives and offers a series 
Executive Summary
To exploit the strategic potential 
of IT managers must:
(1) Realize that there is a fundamental differ-
ence between information technology and 
information systems;
(2) Clearly differentiate strategic information 
systems from tactical information systems;
(3) Evaluate the role of IT in creating value and 
focus on the design and implementation of 
IT-dependent strategic initiatives rather 
than on IT investments;
(4) Evaluate how the resources at the disposal 
of their firm combine with competitors’ 
structural inadequacies to create the po-
tential for value creation and appropriation;
SOME INDUSTRY OBSERVERS have suggested that information technology (IT) has lost its ability to be 
a strategic resource for modern organizations. However, such examples as Harrah’s and Ritz-Carlton 
present evidence to the contrary. Harrah’s has used IT to gather substantial business intelligence 
and identify its best customers, while Ritz-Carlton uses IT to personalize every guest room and ev-
ery stay for its returning customers. Many other firms outside the industry, such as Dell, eBay, and 
Lands’ End, provide further evidence of how sustained competitive advantage can be built around 
IT. While the task is not easy, when firms are successful in doing so the rewards can be tremendous.
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of questions to guide the analysis. The framework 
begins with the following background questions:
(1) Is the proposed initiative aligned with the 
firm’s strategy?;
(2) Is the proposed initiative designed to reduce 
the firm’s costs or to increase customers’ will-
ingness to pay?; and
(3) What is the IS design underpinning the 
proposed initiative?
With the answers to those questions in hand, 
a manager can continue the analysis with the fol-
lowing questions regarding the extent to which 
the competitive advantage arising from the IS 
initiative is sustainable. 
(4) What competitors are appropriately posi-
tioned to replicate the initiative?;
(5) How long before competitors have the same 
functionality in place?;
(6) Will replication do competitors any good?; 
and
(7) What evolutionary paths does the innovation 
create that the innovator can exploit?
Finally, having concluded the background 
and sustainability analysis, the manager can make 
one of the following three determinations about 
the proposed IS strategic initiative:
(1) Develop the IT-dependent strategic initiative 
independently, if the competitive advantage 
is deemed sustainable;
(2) Develop the IT-dependent strategic initiative 
as part of a consortium, if the competitive 
advantage is not sustainable, but the busi-
ness and the industry as a whole will profit 
from the initiative; or
(3) Shelve the proposed initiative, if competi-
tors’ response will degrade value-appropria-
tion potential for all.
Gabriele Piccoli, Ph.D., is an 
assistant professor 
of information 
systems at the 
Cornell University 
School of Hotel 
Administration. 
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To be sure, there is evidence that many 
hospitality firms are not using IT strategically 
and are not achieving benefits commensurate 
with the substantial sums of money being ex-
pended on IT. As an example, a recent study by 
McKinsey concluded that after spending $7.6 
billion in IT between 1995 and 2000, the lodg-
ing industry saw no increase in revenue (after 
controlling for the effects of the booming econ-
omy) and no tangible increase in productivity. 2 
The uncertainty many executives feel about 
how to wrest value from their IT investments 
inspired this report. Surveys have historically 
shown remarkable consistency with the finding 
that the average executive feels that IT deci-
sions are well outside of her or his comfort zone. 
Compounding this problem is the histori-
cal fact that the information systems (IS) func-
tion has traditionally been led by technolo-
gists. Because of the vastly different background 
and knowledge base of the business execu-
tives and the technology executives, the result 
has often been failed communication and a 
delegation of “all IT issues” to technologists. 
More recently, we have witnessed a trend 
reversal, with the IS function being led by many 
“new school” CIOs, who are well versed in the 
business. While this is a step in the right direction, 
it is hardly enough, for all executives must care 
about IT. As the SVP of sales and marketing of a 
branded lodging company recently told me: “Every 
manager must have an IT strategy. You can’t del-
egate to technologists and only worry about your 
allocated cost or what training your employees 
need. You must understand how to be master of 
your own destiny and make IT work best for you.”
Making IT Matter:
A Manager’s Guide to Creating and 
Sustaining Competitive Advantage with 
Information Systems
By Gabriele Piccoli
THOSE AMONG US WHO HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) for less than a decade may think that the IT community is facing challenges never thrown its way before. After all, how do you respond to accusations of the kind 
found in the article titled, “IT Doesn’t Matter,” published in the Harvard Business Review?1 
1 Nicholas G. Carr, “IT Doesn’t Matter,” Harvard 
Business Review, May 2003, pp. 5–12; HBR stirred that 
same pot in similar fashion in 1972 with an article ti-
tled “MIS Is a Mirage,” and in 1966 with a piece titled, 
“The Myth of Real-Time Management Information.”
2 P. Brown and K. Stange, “Investment in 
Information Technology: The Multi-Billion Dollar 
Game of Chance,” Hospitality Business Review, 2002.
CHR Reports
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This is because, as talented as today’s CIOs 
are, they are not spending their time addressing 
operations problems the way COOs do, market-
ing problems the way CMOs do, or financial 
problems the way CFOs do. Mind you, this is 
not a call for hospitality executives to become 
IT technicians. Instead, I believe that knowing 
how to use IT strategically does not so much in-
volve a deep understanding of how technology 
works (even though a bit helps) as it does a deep 
understanding of how IT can be used to create 
and to appropriate economic value. 
As I demonstrate in this report, quibbling 
about whether IT matters is a waste of time. IT 
does matter, of course, and companies like eBay, 
Dell Computers, and Wal-Mart have amply dem-
onstrated that it does. Wal-Mart, for instance, 
leveraged IT to create an unparalleled inventory-
control system. Dell has succeeded with a high-
velocity built-to-order model, while eBay uses 
technology to enable its position as the primary 
online auction site (arguably the only such site). 
The travel and tourism industries have also had 
their share of IT success stories: American Airlines’ 
SABRE is the stuff of legends, and Radisson’s 
look-to-book initiative has also proven quite 
successful. Other recent examples include Ritz-
Carlton’s personalization strategy and Harrah’s 
Entertainment’s business-intelligence initiative. 
The real question then is: What do managers 
need to know to make IT work strategically for 
their company? This report answers that question. 
The report starts with a crucial differen-
tiation between information systems (IS) and 
information technology (IT). It then focuses 
on strategic information systems and how they 
can be used to create and appropriate economic 
value. After discussing established frameworks 
for value creation, I introduce the notion of bar-
riers to replication. Using this concept I show 
how innovative IT-based initiatives can be ana-
lyzed to evaluate their potential for sustainable 
advantage. The report concludes with a series 
of key questions that management must ask to 
assess the sustainability of any IT-enabled stra-
tegic initiative. The answers to those questions 
will tell management how to proceed with the 
initiative, and, indeed, whether to proceed at all. 
For those managers who find their company trail-
ing an innovator, the framework helps deciding 
whether to imitate and, if so, how to best proceed. 
Not All IT Is Created Equal
Over 35 years of information-systems research 
has demonstrated that not all technologies are 
created equal or behave the same—particularly 
when used strategically. An example will show how 
different technologies can produce dramatically 
dissimilar results from a competitive standpoint. 
High Speed Internet Access
During the dot.com days of the late 1990s, as 
the number of internet users was increasing at a 
staggering rate, a host of providers began to offer 
in-room high-speed internet access (HSIA) ca-
pability to hotels. Soon HSIA became one of the 
hottest technologies to hit the lodging industry in 
a while, with hotels implementing the technology 
and offering it as a paid amenity ($9.95 for unlim-
ited use being the most popular pricing option). 
While take rates were much lower than 
expected, HSIA quickly became a “must-offer” 
amenity, based on the assumption that business 
travelers, who were used to high-speed connec-
tions at home and in the office, would snub hotels 
that could not have them surfing in the fast lane. 
The inevitable result was an increasing 
number of properties that offered HSIA free as 
an amenity. For example, in February 2001 the 
Sheraton Vancouver Wall Centre announced that 
it was offering HSIA free of charge to all guests. 
In the press release introducing the initiative the 
HSIA vendor declared: “Offering this service 
as an amenity with no charge to the guest will 
certainly differentiate the Sheraton Vancouver 
Wall Centre from its competitors.” Any hoped-
for differentiation did not last long, however, as 
more properties joined the “free amenity” band-
Understanding the difference between  information 
systems (IS) and information 
technology (IT) is crucial to 
using IT strategically.
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wagon. Soon this amenity moved to the brand 
level, with, for example, Omni Hotels offering 
it system-wide to all guests starting in February 
2003 and Best Western following suit in 2004. 
Following the trend of countless amenities 
before it, HSIA is rapidly becoming a cost of doing 
business for hotels, because (as I explain below) 
it cannot be protected and customers have appro-
priated the added value from this IT innovation. 
Business Intelligence at Harrah’s 
Entertainment
Harrah’s Entertainment has been recently widely 
celebrated for its innovative use of IT in sup-
port of its efforts to better understand its cus-
tomers—a type of initiative known as business 
intelligence. To do so, Harrah’s had to invest 
heavily in technology solutions—an investment 
estimated to exceed $100 million in 2000. Such 
expenditure may seem huge, but the firm made 
a trade-off decision not to invest in properties 
that would wow visitors with their size and 
elaborate design, and instead used the money 
thus saved to create a sound technological 
and organizational brand-wide infrastructure.
Technology is only the beginning of this 
story though. Harrah’s did not simply buy a 
bunch of computer systems, flip on the switch, 
and watch the dollars roll in. Instead, the firm 
embarked on a bold reorganization, centralizing 
and focusing operations around the brand and 
away from individual property interests. As part 
of the reorganization Harrah’s hired a new breed 
of analysts, known as decision scientists. These 
individuals had the mindset and the skills to gather 
and analyze data about gamblers’ characteristics 
and activities. By carrying out scientific experi-
ments, Harrah’s was able to become both more 
efficient (i.e., spend less) and effective (i.e., spend 
better) in its use of funds to attract and retain 
customers, while also increasing share-of-wallet.
The returns on this use of technology have 
been considerable for Harrah’s, even in the face 
of a slowing economy. At the same time, the 
centralized IT infrastructure and the processes 
it has developed enable Harrah’s to expand its 
distribution with relative ease and control. For 
Harrah’s Entertainment, then, IT does matter! 
If nothing else, the above examples raise 
the questions of whether managers should ap-
proach distinct IT-based initiatives differently 
from each other. Put another way, does IT mat-
ter sometimes but not others? 
Two Fundamental Premises
Analyzing the strategic potential of IT begins 
with establishing two fundamental premises: 
first, IS ≠ IT; and, second, exactly what it is 
that constitutes a strategic information system.
IS ≠ IT
Without doubt, information technology engenders 
a plentitude of confusing lingo, technical terms, 
and acronyms—a problem compounded by the 
wealth of half-prepared, fast-talking individuals us-
ing terminology incorrectly. Of all the potentially 
confusing terms, none is more insidious than the 
term information system, usually abbreviated IS. 
In this context, information system is often used 
as a rough synonym for information technology. 
But there is a critical difference between IT and 
IS. Information technology is a component—albeit 
a fundamental one—of an information system. 
The distinction between IS and IT is clari-
fied by the following simple example. The famous 
Plaza Hotel in New York City opened its doors 
on October 1, 1907.3 Did the Plaza have an in-
formation system when it was inaugurated? The 
answer is yes, of course. The Plaza’s information 
system allowed it to take reservations, to check 
guests in and out, to keep track of room status, 
and to manage its inventory of amenities and 
equipment. Yet, the first known front-office imple-
mentation of IT in a hotel (that is, a computer 
system) did not occur until June 27, 1963, when 
the New York Hilton introduced its card-reader-
based, batch-processed front-desk system.4 Clearly, 
while information technology is a fundamental 
component of any modern information system, 
IT and IS are not synonyms. 
3 See: www.fairmont.com.
4 See: Charles I. Sayles, “New York Hilton’s Data-processing 
System,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 
Vol. 4, No. 2 (August 1963), p. 41; and Roy Alvarez, Dennis H. 
Ferguson, and Jerry Dunn, “How Not to Automate Your Front 
Office,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 
Vol. 24, No. 3 (November 1983), pp. 56–62. Interestingly, 
the system was not speedy enough for the New York Hilton’s 
needs, and within a year the hotel had to remove the front-
desk computers—until IT caught up with the hotel’s IS needs.
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With this example in mind, I define an in-
formation system as a socio-technical system that 
includes IT, processes, people, and organizational 
structure. All four components are necessary to 
deliver the information-processing functional-
ities of the IS. More important, any change in 
one component (e.g., a new software program, 
a change in organizational structure from prop-
erty-centric to brand-centric) will affect and 
require adjustment in each of the other compo-
nents—that is, any change has systemic effects. 
The distinction between IT and IS is funda-
mental toward understanding the strategic po-
tential of information systems and of technology. 
With the distinction between IT and IS clarified, 
it should be evident why the firm that focuses 
solely on IT investments to become competi-
tive (i.e., blindly purchasing computer systems) 
is wasting its money. IT investments make sense 
only as components of information systems whose 
information-processing functionality is thought 
to lead to an improved competitive position. 
Adding Strategic to Information 
Systems
The second fundamental premise is to establish 
what aspects of an information system make it 
strategic. The foremost objective of strategy in for-
profit business ventures is to achieve and sustain 
superior financial performance. To do so the firm 
uses its resources to create value by either reducing 
costs5 or by increasing the customers’ willingness 
to pay for its product or services. A firm achieves 
competitive advantage when it is able to create 
distinctive value that no other firm offers by 
creating a positive difference between customers’ 
willingness to pay and the firm’s costs. At that 
point, the firm is in a position to appropriate the 
added value it has created in the form of profits. 
As competitive dynamics play out, the firm’s 
competitors will try to replicate or substitute the 
innovator’s value-adding strategy. When competi-
tors succeed in copying the innovator, it will face 
price pressure leading to customers’ appropria-
tion of value—as is occurring with free HSIA.
Strategic information systems are those that 
enable the creation of the distinctive added val-
ue. The following two key insights follow from 
this definition of strategic information systems.
(1) Strategic information systems are not de-
fined by their functionality or the organizational 
function they support, but instead they are defined 
in terms of their objectives and the purpose they 
serve—improving the firm’s competitive standing. 
(2) Contrary to conventional wisdom, stra-
tegic information systems do not have to rely on 
proprietary technology. eBay, for example, has 
dominated the online auction market since its 
inception using commonly available technology, 
namely, the internet. A simple look at competi-
tors’ auction sites (e.g., Yahoo!, Amazon.com) 
reveals that they offer comparable functionalities. 
The key lesson here is that what needs to be dis-
tinctive and hard to imitate is the value-creating 
strategy that is built on a specifically designed 
information system of which the technology is 
a fundamental component. As I discuss below, 
replicating the IT at the core of defendable stra-
tegic information systems is often a useless move. 
The definition of strategic information systems 
given here is useful in discriminating the many 
systems that are not strategic. These are systems 
that do not position the firm to create distinctive 
value, even though they are important and some-
times crucial for the business’s operations. I refer 
to these as tactical systems. Some examples follow.
• A restaurant’s fundamental information system, 
anchored by its POS, which is used to manage 
reservations, seating, order taking, and deliv-
ery, is crucial to the operation of modern res-
Information technology has spawned a plentitude of 
confusing lingo, but the important 
concept is that an information 
system includes information 
technology, as well as people, 
processes, and organizational 
structures.
5 Strictly speaking, value creation is the difference between 
customers’ willingness to pay (the maximum amount of money 
customers are willing to give to the firm to obtain its products and 
services) and supplier opportunity cost (the minimum amount 
of money the firm’s suppliers are willing to accept to work with 
the firm). For simplicity I use the actual firm cost as a proxy 
for supplier opportunity cost as actual cost is more intuitive.
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taurants. A system such as this is generally tac-
tical, because it rarely creates distinctive value. 
• Likewise, a hotel’s fundamental informa-
tion system, built around the PMS it uses 
to manage room reservations, is crucial to 
operations. Even though it’s unlikely that any 
hotel beyond a tiny property could efficiently 
run without such a system, it is tactical, for 
it generally does not create distinctive value.
• Similarly, no matter how well it is run, an e-
mail system is unlikely to be the foundation 
of a strategic information system. The same 
argument can be made for productivity soft-
ware such as Microsoft Word and Excel, no 
matter how advanced their features may be.
Implementing or upgrading tactical sys-
tems will therefore not create strategic advan-
tage. Thus the following two key questions 
remain. How can IT be used to create add-
ed value? How can the firm ensure its ability 
to appropriate the value created over time?
How IT Can Create Added Value
In the course of explaining the nature of hospi-
tality IT applications, I have hinted at the ways 
that some operations have used information 
systems to create added value. In the examples 
that follow, I point out in greater detail how 
technology can be used to create value by either 
reducing the firm’s costs or by increasing the cus-
tomers’ willingness to pay for the firm’s product 
or services. Returning to the case of Harrah’s 
Entertainment, here is an example of a strategy 
that creates value by reducing the firm’s cost. 
Drawing on the information provided by guests 
who use their total rewards cards, Harrah’s has 
been able to fine tune its use of comps. By some 
accounts, with its ability to efficiently disburse 
its comp budget, Harrah’s has saved enough 
money to pay for the technology. An example 
of a strategy that increases customers’ willing-
ness to pay is that of Wyndham ByRequest. For 
a segment of business travelers, namely those 
frequent travelers that don’t travel often enough 
to redeem competitors’ points, the instant grati-
fication offered by Wyndham ByRequest may 
offer considerable value. Converting these fre-
quent guests to loyal Wyndham customers is 
a way for Wyndham to appropriate the value 
it created, without having to increase rates.6 
The key insight is that the companies in-
volved focused not on the technology but on 
what I term IT-dependent strategic initiatives. IT-
dependent strategic initiatives are those projects 
that rely heavily on IT (i.e., they cannot feasibly 
be enacted without investments in IT) to create 
added value. IT-dependent strategic initiatives 
consist of the configuration of an activity system 
that is enabled by IT and is designed to create 
and appropriate economic value. Typical strategic 
initiatives include business-process reengineering, 
customer-relationship management, organization-
al learning, knowledge management, electronic 
commerce, electronic business, and infrastruc-
ture initiatives, as well as such limited programs 
as introducing internet cafés on cruise ships. 
A number of frameworks have been ad-
vanced over the years to help managers in eval-
uating and developing IT-dependent strategic 
initiatives. In the remainder of this section I 
highlight some of those frameworks with refer-
ences to material that describes them in depth.
Critical Success Factors
The critical-success-factor (CSF) methodology 
focuses on the use of information systems to further 
a business’s key performance drivers.7 Thus, the 
Hotel companies can use information technology to 
create and appropriate added value 
when their strategic initiatives 
build barriers to erosion. 
6 This example helps to highlight the fundamental insight 
that price decisions are consequential to value creation. To 
create value a firm needs to do something customers value, 
so that they are willing to pay for it. Simply raising prices 
is not a value-creating strategy. On the other hand, having 
created value, the firm can increase prices or find other ways 
to appropriate it. For example, while Wyndham may leave 
rates unchanged, every loyal customer who books on the 
company website (instead of through a third party) creates 
much more flow-through to the bottom line, thus allow-
ing Wyndham to appropriate some of the value it created. 
7 J. Rockart, “Chief Executives Define their Own Data Needs,” 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 57 (March–April 1979), pp. 81–93.
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CSF approach calls for evaluating whether an IT-
dependent strategic initiative will have a favorable 
effect on those drivers. This approach enables 
the firm to prioritize initiatives in a structured 
fashion based on accepted drivers of performance. 
Value Chain
The classic value-chain model shows how infor-
mation can be used at any stage of the value-cre-
ation process to lower costs, enhance differen-
tiation, or support relationships among different 
firms in a value system. 8
Virtual Value Chain
The virtual value chain (VVC) model focuses on 
the use of information to create value.9 It shows 
how managers can use the substantial amount of 
information that is typically generated during the 
course of business and transform it into valuable 
insights, new processes, or new products or services. 
Customer Service Life Cycle
The Customer Service Life Cycle (CSLC) focuses 
on the use of technology to enable outstanding 
customer service.10 The CSLC breaks down the 
firm–customer relationships into twelve stages 
and demonstrates how IT can be used to support 
customers’ needs and create value at each stage. 
Regardless of which model a company uses to 
explore value creation, that is only half the battle. 
Appropriating the value created is the other half.
Appropriating Value Over Time
The major criticism levied against the potential 
for sustained performance associated with IT in-
novation is that technology is easily replicated 
by competitors, who can quickly offer the same 
functionalities. Put in the framework of value 
creation, the accusation is that IT helps compa-
nies create value that they cannot appropriate 
over time because competitors can easily imitate 
the innovation. This argument simply misses 
the point. Because IS ≠ IT, creating and appro-
priating value hinges on successfully deploying 
a defendable IT-dependent strategic initiative. 
Response lag. Competitive imitation occurs 
in stages. Once a firm’s rivals find themselves 
at a disadvantage, they search for the sources 
of the firm’s competitive advantage. If they 
are successful in identifying those sources, the 
competitors must decide whether they are able 
and willing to respond and, if they are, what ap-
proach to take. Response lag, that is, the time it 
takes competitors to respond aggressively enough 
to erode a firm’s competitive advantage, is the 
delay in competitive response. The longer the 
time and the higher the cost of replication, the 
more resilient is the firm’s advantage. Response-
lag drivers are defined here as the characteristics 
of the technology, the firm, its competitors, or 
the value system in which the firm is embedded, 
that combine to make replication of the IT-de-
pendent strategic initiative difficult and costly.
My analysis of the strategic-information-sys-
tems literature and my own research of multiple 
cases11 suggest that response-lag drivers can be 
grouped into one of the following four barriers 
to erosion of competitive advantage: (1) IT-re-
sources barrier, (2) complementary-resources 
barrier, (3) IT-project barrier, and (4) preemp-
tion barrier. The magnitude of each barrier to 
erosion is determined by the strength of its re-
sponse-lag drivers. I briefly describe each barrier 
to erosion below and detail each of the response-
lag drivers associated with them in the appendix.
Barrier 1: IT resources. IT-dependent stra-
tegic initiatives rely on access to the resources 
and capabilities necessary to produce and use 
the technology at the core. Two classes of re-
sponse-lag drivers contribute to the height of the 
IT-resources barrier; these are IT resources and 
8 M. Porter and V. Millar, “How Information Gives You 
a Competitive Advantage,” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 63 
(July–August 1985), pp. 149–160. 
9 J. Rayport and J. Sviokla, “Exploiting the Virtual Value 
Chain,” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 73 (November–December 
1995), pp. 75–85.
10 G. Piccoli, B.R. Spalding, and B. Ives, “The Customer 
Service Life Cycle: A Framework for Internet Use in 
Support of Customer Service,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant 
Administration Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 38–45.
11 See, for example: G. Piccoli and L.M. Applegate,  “Canyon 
Ranch,” Harvard Business School Publishing, 9-805-027, 2004; 
G. Piccoli, B. Bass, and B. Ives, “Custom Made Apparel at 
Lands’ End,” MIS Quarterly Executive, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2003), 
pp. 74 – 85; G. Piccoli and L.M. Applegate, “Wyndham 
International: Fostering High-Touch with High-Tech,” 
Harvard Business School Publishing, 9-803-092, 2003; and B. 
Ives and G. Piccoli, “Rice Epicurian Shopping: Decadence or 
Destiny?,” Communications of the AIS, Vol. 9, Article 18 (2002).
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IT Technical Skills and Business 
Understanding
IT technical skills relate to the ability to design and 
develop ef fective computer applications. They include 
proficiency in system analysis and design, infrastruc-
ture design, and programming. Another element is 
the depth of business understanding of IT specialists. 
Business understanding enables the IT specialists 
charged with developing the technology supporting IT-
dependent strategic initiatives to envision a creative 
and feasible technical solution to business problems. 
A high level of business understanding also contrib-
utes to the creation of response lag by mitigating the 
risks associated with the introduction of the strategic 
initiative and the relative investments in technology. 
IT-management Skills
IT-management skills refer to the firm’s ability to pro-
vide leadership for the IS function, manage IT proj-
ects, integrate dif ferent technical skills, evaluate 
technology options, select appropriate technology 
sources, and manage change ensuing from the intro-
duction of IT. IT-management skills, because of their 
idiosyncratic and socially complex nature and the 
learning curve associated with their development, are 
a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Mana-
gerial IT skills can contribute to creating substantial 
response lag when techniques and routines developed 
over time can substantially reduce development costs 
and development lead times. Competitors who at-
tempt to replicate the initiative but lack the same high 
level of managerial  
IT skills as the innovator face substantial obstacles to 
imitation.
Relationship Asset
The relationship asset is accumulated over time and 
finds its roots in a mutual respect and trusting rap-
port between the IS function and business managers. 
When a firm has developed a substantial relationship 
asset, IS specialists and business managers are able 
to work together ef fectively by coordinating and com-
municating extensively. Having developed the relation-
ship, they share a vision for the role of IT within the 
business. Business clients share the risk and accept 
the responsibility for IT projects, and IS specialists 
are able to anticipate a business’s IT needs and de-
vise solutions that support these needs. 
IT Assets
IT assets are technology resources available to the or-
ganization, including hardware components (e.g., a pri-
vate network connecting globally distributed locations), 
software applications and environments (e.g., a propri-
etary revenue management system using custom-devel-
oped models), and data repositories. These resources 
contribute to building response lag directly, by simplify-
ing and speeding up the development and introduction 
of the initiative’s IT core, or indirectly, by making it dif-
f icult for competitors who have no ready access to the 
needed IT resources to replicate leader’s initiative. 
IT Infrastructure
An IT infrastructure is a set of IT components that 
are interconnected and managed by IT specialists 
with the objective of providing a set of standard ser-
vices to the organization. Thus, the IT infrastructure 
provides the foundation for the delivery of business 
applications. With IT infrastructure-development 
times generally estimated to exceed five years, the 
response lag and ensuing barrier to imitation is likely 
to be substantial. 
Information Repositories
Information is now widely recognized as a fundamen-
tal organizational resource, and firms are investing 
significantly to improve their ability to collect, store, 
manage, and distribute it. Information repositories 
are often large data stores containing extensive in-
formation about customers, suppliers, products, or 
operations, organized in a structured form that is ac-
cessible and useable for decision-making purposes. 
A firm’s information repositories can contribute to 
the development of substantial response lag by sup-
porting strategic initiatives. Competitors attempting 
to replicate the leader’s strategic initiative must not 
only duplicate the IT at its core, but they must also ac-
cumulate a comparable information resource—a feat 
that, by definition, of ten takes substantial time.
IT Capabilities
IT capabilities are derived from the skills and abili-
ties of the firm’s workforce. These capabilities directly 
influence the response lag associated with the intro-
duction of IT at the core of IT-dependent strategies be-
cause they facilitate the technology’s design and devel-
opment. These capabilities also play a fundamental role 
in enabling ef fective and timely implementation, mainte-
nance, and use of the technology. 
Barriers to Erosion #1: IT Resources Barrier
Hospitality companies have available numerous response-lag drivers that help build the barriers to erosion. The 
following are the drivers that support the IT resources barrier.
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IT capabilities. As an initiative becomes more 
reliant on preexisting IT such resources as the 
IT infrastructure and data repositories and such 
capabilities as IT development and management 
skills, it becomes increasingly difficult to copy. 
Barrier 2: Complementary resources. While 
IT is by definition a fundamental component of 
any IT-dependent strategic initiative, successful 
implementation of such an initiative requires 
that complementary organizational resources 
be mobilized as well. Thus, to implement an 
IT-dependent strategic initiative, the firm must 
develop or acquire the necessary complemen-
tary resources (e.g., physical assets such as a 
hotel, intangible assets such as a brand). As an 
initiative becomes more reliant on distinctive 
complementary resources, the complementary-
resources barrier to imitation strengthens, and 
replication of the strategy becomes slower, costlier, 
and more difficult. In this situation, competitors 
will have to acquire or develop not only the IT 
at the core of the strategy, but also the comple-
mentary resources that underpin the initiative. 
Barrier 3: IT projects. IT-dependent stra-
tegic initiatives rely on an essential enabling 
IT core, but they cannot be implemented until 
the necessary technology has been successfully 
introduced. The response-lag drivers of the IT 
project barrier are driven by the characteristics of 
the technology and the implementation process. 
Information technologies are not homogeneous, 
undifferentiated entities. To the contrary, they 
differ substantially with respect to their intrinsic 
characteristics, their ability to complement other 
organizational resources, the context in which 
they are introduced and used, and the degree of 
organizational change that needs to occur during 
the implementation process. For example, while 
a web site can easily be designed and deployed, 
large infrastructure projects (e.g., data warehous-
es) are complex, lengthy, and prone to failure. 
Barrier 4: Preemption. Even if a competitor 
is able to replicate an IT initiative, the response 
may bear no fruit for the laggard. This is true when 
the IT-dependent strategic initiative pioneered by 
the first mover creates a preferential relationship 
with customers or other members of the value 
system and introduce substantial switching costs. 
Under these circumstances it is not enough for 
competitors merely to imitate the leader’s strategy; 
they need either to compensate the customer for 
the cost of switching or provide enough additional 
value to justify the customer’s decision to incur 
the switching costs. That is, imitators must be 
“that much better,” where that much is an amount 
greater than the current value of all co-special-
ized investments that the customer has made. 
The Dynamics of Sustainability
When launching IT-dependent strategic ini-
tiatives, as with any other strategic initiative, 
a firm must have a plan for continuously re-
maining ahead of the competition. This means 
looking for opportunities to reinvigorate and 
reinforce the barriers to erosion that I just dis-
cussed. Two primary ways to do this are capabil-
ity development and asset-stock accumulation. 
Capability development. Capability devel-
opment is the process by which an organization 
is able to improve its performance over time by 
enhancing its ability to use available resources 
for maximum effectiveness. When it comes to 
IT-dependent strategic initiatives, the firm is 
able to engage in “learning by using” to develop 
a superior ability to use the firm’s resources. For 
example, reflecting on their success with SABRE, 
some of the pioneers suggested that SABRE was 
developed to respond to an internal crisis: man-
aging American Airlines’ growing inventory of 
seats and routes. Once SABRE was in place and 
American Airlines began using it with increas-
ing competence, its potential as a distribution 
channel became apparent. As this example in-
dicates, there is a mutually reinforcing dynamic 
between response-lag drivers and a firm’s IT-de-
pendent strategic initiative. Response-lag drivers 
offer the firm a “head start” on the competition. 
The enactment of the strategy enables the firm 
to engage in the learning process, leading to 
Many of the assets that support strategic IT 
initiatives must be built up 
over time—thereby delaying 
competitors’ efforts to imitate the 
initiative.
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further development of the response-lag driv-
ers and the preservation of barriers to imitation. 
Asset-stock accumulation. Many assets un-
derpinning an IT-dependent strategic initiative 
cannot be acquired in the market (e.g., special-
ized databases and forecasting models, a company 
reputation or brand). Rather, such assets must be 
built up and developed over time as a result of a 
consistent process of accumulation. At the core 
of the Harrah’s initiative that I discussed above, 
for example, are a comprehensive repository of 
personal and behavioral data about each gambler 
and predictive computer models of a gambler’s 
projected worth. The ability Harrah’s has to 
collect data and develop the predictive models 
depends on having the information systems for 
data collection, storage, analysis, and distribu-
tion in place. These only became available when 
Harrah’s launched its IT-dependent strategic ini-
tiative. Moreover, no matter how committed a 
competitor may be, the process of data accumula-
tion requires time to complete. For example, if a 
destination customer visits a Las Vegas property 
once per quarter to play blackjack, collecting six 
data points about that customer (i.e., informa-
tion on six visits) requires one and one-half years. 
For these reasons, sustainability often does not 
stem from visionary one-time initiatives, but from 
evolutionary ones predicated on a commitment to 
capability building and asset-stock accumulation. 
On this basis, the firm can develop the strategic ini-
tiative, offering a moving target to its competitors 
by reinforcing its barriers to imitation over time.
In the next section I weave the above in-
sights together to show how they can be used 
to help gauge the degree of sustainability of an 
IT-dependent strategic initiative.
Asking the Tough Questions about 
Sustainability
When looking to be innovative with informa-
tion technology it is easy to get wrapped up in 
wishful thinking about the potential of IT. In 
this section I show how to use the concepts in-
troduced above when evaluating IT-dependent 
initiatives either as innovators looking to protect 
an existing advantage, or as laggards looking for 
ways to attack the innovator. I have found that 
asking the series of increasingly specific ques-
tions given below provides the optimal proce-
dure to approach this difficult analysis.12 The 
focus here is on sustainability and I therefore 
assume that the IT-dependent strategic initia-
tive does create value and is consistent with the 
firm’s priorities. However, I offer a set of prereq-
uisite questions for completeness of treatment.
Prerequisite Questions
(1) Is the proposed initiative aligned with the firm’s 
strategy? This crucial question often goes unasked 
until late in the analysis. (Sometimes it never gets 
asked!) This question is important, because it is 
necessary for the proponents of the initiative to 
be able to formulate how the initiative advances 
the firm’s positioning and strategy. To approach 
this question in a systematic manner, proponents 
should identify the firm’s CSFs and clearly show 
how the initiative feeds those success factors by 
fostering the positive ones or curtailing threats.
(2) Is the proposed initiative focused on reducing 
the firm’s cost or increasing customers’ willingness 
to pay? Rare, but particularly coveted initiatives 
have the potential to accomplish both—de-
creasing the firm’s cost while increasing custom-
ers’ willingness to pay. The value of this ques-
tion is in requiring managers to clearly define 
the value proposition of the planned initiative. 
12 I frame the analysis here referring to a proposed initia-
tive. Thus, I take the perspective of the innovator evaluating 
a new initiative. The same script can be used, with minor 
adjustments, by followers.
Questions to begin the analysis of an IT-dependent strategic 
initiative: 
(1) Is the proposed initiative aligned 
with the firm’s strategy? 
(2) Is the proposed initiative 
focused on reducing the firm’s cost 
or increasing customers’ willingness 
to pay? 
(3) What is the IS design 
underpinning the proposed 
initiative?
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Structural Resources
Structural resources comprise non-IT-related tangible 
and intangible internal assets used by the firm in the 
enactment of its IT-dependent strategic initiative. 
Tangible Resources
In theory, any tangible resource available to the firm 
can underpin an IT-dependent strategic initiative. 
Among these are competitive scope, physical assets, 
scale of operations and market share, organizational 
structure, governance, and slack resources. A classic 
example of the application of tangible resources is  
Dell Corporation, which was able to parlay its direct-
to-consumer sales model into a successful web-based 
strategy. 
Intangible Resources
As in the case of tangible resources nearly any of a 
firm’s intangible resources can support an IT-depen-
dent initiative. Examples of commonly cited intangible 
resources that can be so applied include: corporate 
culture, top management’s commitment, and the ability 
to manage risk. As with tangible IT resources, comple-
mentary intangible resources create response lag by 
making a strategic initiative dif ficult to imitate. 
Action Resources
A firm’s action resources define how the firm car-
ries out its productive activities. The action resources 
specify what activities are performed and what steps 
or business processes make up those activities. The 
activities that the firm performs and the manner in 
which it performs them contribute to response lag and 
help sustain competitive advantage created by the ini-
tiative. 
Activity System
A performance-maximizing activity system relies on a 
set of economic activities that are both interlocking 
and mutually reinforcing, expressly showing internal 
consistency (internal fit) and appropriately configured 
given the firm’s external environment (external fit). 
Although IT is one of the fundamental components of 
the strategy, it still must fit within the entire activity 
system. When a firm has implemented a given configu-
ration of activities and has developed the IT core sup-
porting the linked activities, replication of the technolo-
gy alone is insufficient for successful imitation. Indeed, 
narrowly replicating just the IT core leads to further 
Barriers to Erosion #2: Complementary Resources Barrier
Hospitality companies have available numerous response-lag drivers that help build the barriers to erosion. The fol-
lowing are the drivers that support the complementary resources barrier. 
decline of the imitator’s position by wasting time, 
money, and management attention without eroding 
the leader’s competitive advantage. A classic exam-
ple of a firm that has an idiosyncratic activity system 
is Southwest Airlines. Because Southwest does not 
cater flights, does not of fer seat assignments, has 
a standardized fleet of aircrafts, uses less crowd-
ed airports, and focuses on point-to-point travel by 
price-sensitive customers, it is relatively resistant to 
competitive imitation. Merely imitating one aspect of 
Southwest’s activity system will not suffice, but at-
tempting to duplicate the entire package at minimum 
generates considerable response lag. 
Business Processes
A business process is defined as the “specific order-
ing of work activities across time and place, with a 
beginning, an end, and clearly identified inputs and 
outputs: a structure for action.”* The notion of busi-
ness process is related to, but distinct from that of 
the economic activities discussed above. Economic 
activities describe the set of undertakings that the 
firm performs, while business processes describe 
the way in which the firm performs them. The con-
tribution that business processes make to response 
lag and to the height of barriers to imitation depends 
on their distinctiveness and strategic value. When a 
firm is able to introduce an IT-dependent strategic 
initiative built around a business process with char-
acteristics of uniqueness and dif ferentiation, signifi-
cant barriers to imitation are erected. 
External Resources
External resources are assets (such as brand, repu-
tation, and inter-organizational relationship assets) 
that do not reside internally with the firm but accu-
mulate with other firms and with consumers. Gener-
ally intangible, external resources are usually devel-
oped over time. 
When a firm’s IT-dependent strategic initiative can 
make use of or contribute to the development of 
these external resources, it considerably improves 
response lag and augments barriers to imitation. 
Thus, the firm forces competitors to develop a com-
parable level of external resources before producing 
an ef fective response.
*T. Davenport, Process Innovation: Reengineering Work  
through Information Technology (Boston: Harvard Business  
School Press, 1993), p. 5.
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IT Characteristics
Information technologies dif fer with respect to their 
complexity, distinctiveness, and visibility to competi-
tors. 
IT Complexity
Dif ferent IT applications have dif ferent degrees of 
complexity (e.g., complicated data warehouses versus 
simple web sites). The complexity of the technology is 
a function of the bundle of skills and knowledge neces-
sary to ef fectively design, develop, implement, and use 
the IT in question. Technology complexity raises the IT 
project barrier by increasing development lead times 
for a competitive response.
IT Uniqueness
On the low end of the IT uniqueness continuum are 
self-contained, of f-the-shelf IT products that need little 
integration or customization (e.g., an electronic mail 
system). At the high end are custom-developed appli-
cations or infrastructure subsystems that are unavail-
able in the open market. When the IT underlying the 
innovator’s strategy is not distinctive, competitors can 
engage consultants or service firms to aid them in 
reducing knowledge barriers and, thereby, reduce the 
imitation response lag. Unique IT makes this process 
much more dif ficult.
Visibility
Visibility is the extent to which competitors can ob-
serve the enabling technology. The visibility dimension 
can be conceptualized as a continuum spanning from 
custom developed internal systems (e.g., a data ware-
house), which are virtually invisible to competitors, to 
immediately visible inter-organizational or customer-
facing systems that require extensive education and 
selling to external users or customers (e.g., an online 
purchasing system). IT that is highly visible and is 
readily available for inspection by competitors limits 
the strength of the IT project barrier. 
Implementation Process
Since dif ferent kinds of information technology are 
inherently dissimilar, it makes sense that the pro-
cesses by which they are implemented and become 
available to the organization also dif fer. Depending on 
the implementation characteristics of the IT core of 
the strategic initiative in question, the strength of the 
barriers to imitation changes considerably. 
Implementation-process Complexity
Implementation-process complexity is a function of 
the size and scope of the project, the number of func-
tional units involved, the complexity of user require-
ments, and possible political issues, among other 
things. IT infrastructure projects represent a pow-
erful example of complex systems that have a sub-
stantial lead time. While the components may be 
commodity-like (e.g., personal computers, server, tele-
communication equipment), it is dif ficult to integrate 
them into an ef fective system. 
Degree of Process Change
Business processes often need to change to fit a 
new system—particularly in the case of large, highly 
integrated enterprise systems. The challenges es-
calate when several organizations or operations use 
the technology involved in the strategic initiative. The 
more departments that are involved and the more 
organizational boundaries crossed, the harder and 
the riskier the change becomes. Yet, as complexity 
increases, so do the dif ficulties encountered by com-
petitors in imitating the strategy. 
Barriers to Erosion #3: IT Project Barriers
Hospitality companies have available numerous response-lag drivers that help build the barriers to erosion. The fol-
lowing are the drivers that support the IT project barriers. 
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(3) What is the IS design underpinning the 
proposed initiative? This question is designed to 
formalize even more the analysis begun with 
the second question. At this stage in the analy-
sis one needs to achieve clarity with respect 
to the information-processing functionalities 
of the information system supporting the pro-
posed initiative. Each of the four components—
IT, people, processes, and organization struc-
tures—also needs to be discussed to evaluate 
what changes to the current information sys-
tems and what new resources may be needed. 
Sustainability Questions
The analysis of sustainability assumes that the 
initiative has created value. At this point it is 
important for managers to receive some guid-
ance regarding ways to appropriate that value 
(i.e., to ensure sustainability). While it is im-
possible to estimate perfectly the magnitude 
of any particular barrier to erosion, the pur-
pose of this analysis is to refine the strategy, 
identify areas of potential weakness, and to 
identify areas where changes to the initiative—
often small—can substantially strengthen it. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this 
analysis is to identify initiatives that are not sus-
tainable. Because it is important to understand 
when to avoid investing in expensive IT proj-
ects, the following questions can raise red flags 
before substantial resources are committed to an 
initiative.
(1) What competitors are appropriately positioned 
to replicate the initiative? Based on a clear under-
standing of the characteristics of the proposed 
IT-dependent strategic initiative the objective of 
this competitor analysis is to evaluate the strength 
of the IT-resource and complementary-resource 
barriers to erosion. Competitor analysis allows 
the innovator to identify sources of asymmetry 
that can be exploited and amplified through 
the deployment of the proposed initiative. The 
boxes on pages 10, 13, 14, and 16 provide a list 
of response-lag drivers to guide this analysis. The 
objective is to design the initiative so that it takes 
advantage of the existing sources of asymmetry 
and provides a basis to reinforce them over time 
through capability development and asset-stock 
accumulation. A powerful opportunity here is to 
take advantage of competitors’ rigidities, which 
are resources that hamper competitors’ ability 
to replicate an innovation. A classic example 
is provided by firms with strong distribution 
ties (e.g., Compaq computers, Levi’s), which 
could not easily replicate direct sellers’ use of 
the internet (e.g., Dell, Lands’ End) because of 
channel conflict. While Compaq, for example, 
may have had the ability to sell directly as Dell 
does, it could not risk upsetting its dealers, who 
were responsible for the bulk of its distribution. 
The result of this analysis will be a clearer un-
derstanding of which competitors are in a po-
sition to respond quickly to the IT-dependent 
strategic initiative and which will instead need 
first to acquire necessary resources or capabilities. 
This analysis may also provide guidance as to 
how hard it would be for competitors to acquire 
these prerequisite resources. It is clear that when 
fundamental resources are heterogeneously dis-
tributed, simply replicating the technology at the 
core of the innovator’s initiative is not enough to 
be able to offer a comparable value proposition. 
(2) How long before competitors have the 
same information-processing functionality in place? 
This question is primarily concerned with the 
effort and response lag associated with the cre-
ation, rollout, and infusion of the information 
systems at the heart of the IT-dependent stra-
tegic initiative. This analysis yields an assess-
ment of the strength of the IT project barrier.
Questions to assess the sustainability of an IT-
dependent strategic initiative: 
(1) What competitors are 
appropriately positioned to 
replicate the initiative? 
(2) How long before competitors 
have the same information-
processing functionality in place? 
(3) Will replication do competitors 
any good? 
(4) What evolutionary paths does 
the innovation create? 
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Switching Costs
Switching costs represent the total costs borne by 
the parties of an exchange when one of them leaves 
the exchange—including psychological, physical, and 
economic costs. “Switching costs are the norm, not 
the exception, in the information economy.”1 IT-depen-
dent strategic initiatives, which rely heavily on the col-
lection, storage, manipulation, and distribution of in-
formation, are particularly subject to switching costs. 
Co-specialized Tangible Investments
An IT-dependent strategic initiative may require that 
the firm’s customers acquire the physical assets nec-
essary to participate in the initiative. The total capi-
tal outlay necessary to obtain these assets is termed 
co-specialized tangible investments. These range from 
computer hardware and telecommunication equip-
ment to software applications and interfaces between 
the existing customer’s systems and the firm’s IT. For 
example, hotel franchisees buy costly interfaces for 
the franchising brands’ reservation system. These in-
terfaces become valueless if the property is re-brand-
ed. The extent to which the IT-dependent strategic 
initiative requires co-specialized tangible investments 
determines the potential for strong barriers to imita-
tion associated with the initiative. 
Co-specialized Intangible Investments
As is true of tangible investments, the deployment of 
an IT-dependent strategic initiative often necessitates 
a firm’s customers or channel partners to invest time 
and money to take part in the initiative. An investment 
of this kind is known as a co-specialized intangible in-
vestment. For instance, to benefit from customer re-
lationship management initiatives, customers often 
need to take the time to complete a profile. Co-spe-
cialized intangible investments might include “set-up” 
costs as well as ongoing costs (e.g., retraining new  
associates using a reservation system). Information 
repositories represent perhaps the most important 
class of co-specialized intangible investments in the 
information age. Considerable switching costs can be 
built on information accumulated over time. An inter-
esting example is of fered by information that is valu-
able only as long as the customer is using the firm’s 
products or services (e.g., revenue-management mod-
els and historical records that are brand specific and 
become valueless if the hotel is re-branded).2  
Barriers to Erosion #4: Preemption Barrier
Hospitality companies have available numerous response-lag drivers that help build the barriers to erosion. The fol-
lowing are the drivers that support the IT project barriers. 
 
The same situation occurs even when switching costs 
are not readily apparent. Some forward-looking banks 
are attempting to take advantage of their many net-
work connections to reach a position of “trusted con-
solidator” of top clients’ complex financial positions. 
This strategy entails the collection of extensive infor-
mation about customers’ banking profiles and ser-
vices used; insurance holdings; investment portfolio; 
mortgage, credit, and loan positions; and scheduled 
bill payments. The bank in this instance need not pro-
vide all of the services in question, but it strives to 
of fer a consolidated view that customers find valuable 
and costly to transfer to competitors. Note that even 
when switching costs appear to be low, their pres-
ence can be critical for strategy development. 
Value-system Structure
A firm does not engage in economic activity in isola-
tion, but as a link in a larger value chain or system 
that includes upstream and downstream members. 
The structure of this value system can provide oppor-
tunities for preemptive strategies and for the exploi-
tation of the response-lag drivers discussed here. The 
structure of the value system does not directly af fect 
the strength of the preemption barrier to imitation, 
but instead magnifies or diminishes the preemptive 
ef fects of switching costs. 
Relationship Exclusivity
An exclusive relationship exists when participants in 
the value system will elect to do business with only 
one firm that provides a particular set of products 
or services. The firm’s counterpart (i.e., customer or 
supplier) places a premium on dealing with either the 
firm or one of its competitors, but not both. Relation-
ship exclusivity is the norm with IT-dependent initia-
tives that provide integration services and that ben-
efit from the accumulation of historical information. 
When first introduced, the American Airlines SABRE 
terminal for travel agents created strong incentives 
for relationship exclusivity, as travel agents did not 
want to waste valuable of fice space for competitors’ 
proprietary terminals (e.g., United’s Apollo), which 
were considered essentially duplicates of the SABRE 
terminal.
When a business relationship benefits from exclusiv-
ity, the customer faces penalties for hedging behavior 
and for sourcing the needed product or service from 
multiple firms. Thus, should competitors introduce 
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A traditional IT development and imple-
mentation process follows life-cycle stages from 
inception to full functionality. This process gen-
erally includes the following sequential stages: 
vision, approval, build, rollout, and infusion.13 
Upon completion of the process the cycle of-
ten restarts with enhancements to the system.14
Competitors looking to have the same in-
formation-processing functionality in place need 
to enter a similar development and implementa-
tion cycle. The only difference is that a follower 
will start the process with an awakening phase, 
rather than a vision phase. The awakening stage 
occurs when the competitor realizes that the 
innovator has an advantage. The timing of the 
awakening depends on the characteristics of the 
initiative and can occur when the competitor 
begins to witness losses (e.g., market share, rev-
enue), when the innovation is first introduced 
(typically for customer-facing systems), or even 
before the innovator has launched the initiative. 
Knowledge of behavior patterns exhibited by 
competitors may help in gauging the timing of 
the awakening and of the subsequent stages. For 
example, Burger King has traditionally shown a 
propensity to quickly enter geographical markets 
pioneered by McDonald’s. While not technology 
related, this type of knowledge of the competi-
tion is what allows the innovator to estimate lead 
time more precisely. In some rare cases, some 
competitors will find imitation so daunting that 
they will elect not to follow. SABRE and Apollo 
emerged as the dominant airline reservation 
systems because other airlines elected early on 
not to follow the lead of American and United. 
(3) Will replication do competitors any good? 
Armed with an understanding of which com-
petitors will be in a position to respond to the 
innovation and a general idea of how long it 
may take them to have the same functionality 
13 Infusion represents the process by which an innovation 
comes to permeate the organization and operations. This is a 
challenging stage that requires end-user acceptance and man-
agement sponsorship. If infusion is successful, the technology 
becomes an integral part of how the firm does business.
14 The attentive reader will note that the rationale of-
fered by those who suggest that IT is not strategic because 
it is easily imitable (for example, Carr, op. cit.) is that the 
technology can easily be replicated. In other words, this ra-
tionale addresses only the build and rollout phases of the IT 
development cycle. Those patient enough to read up to this 
point know that there is much more to IT-dependent strategic 
initiatives than simply technology development!
1C. Shapiro and H. Varian, Information Rules: A Strate- 
gic Guide to the Network Economy (Boston: Harvard  
Business School Press, 1998), p.111. Also see this book  
for an excellent treatment of switching costs in the  
information age.
2The software here is neither proprietary nor brand 
specific, and the data are not acquired over a network or 
hosted by the brand. Yet, the historic data and the models 
the hotel has developed assume that the hotel has a given 
brand (e.g., Four Seasons). If the hotel is re-branded, while 
the software, the data, and the models are retained, their 
value is much lower because the data and models are 
specific to the original brand and assume the hotel sports 
the related flag (e.g., has access to the Four Seasons 
brand equity, reservation systems, loyal customer base).
competing of fers, customers are already  
invested in their relationship with the  
incumbent.
Concentrated Value-system Link
At each of the various stages or links of the 
value system the degree of concentration in 
the link is inversely proportional to the num-
ber of suitable business entities populating 
that link—where suitability depends on wheth-
er the firm would find the products or ser-
vices of fered by the vendors populating the 
link acceptable. A highly concentrated link is 
one where there are relatively few organiza-
tions or consumers available for the firm to 
use or serve. In the case of airline GDSs, for 
instance, the total number of travel agents 
serving the market targeted by the airline 
sponsoring the system represents the con-
centrated link. A market of given size will sup-
port only a finite number of competitors, and 
achieving a substantial penetration in the 
concentrated value-system link—by definition, 
a small market—is necessary to successfully 
preempt imitation. As the degree of concen-
tration increases, the time necessary to se-
cure a relationship with a substantial pro-
portion of the link decreases—all else being 
equal. Consequently, the leader has a better 
chance of capturing a substantial proportion 
of relationships and be able to use switching 
costs to “lock out” competitors and maximize 
its barriers to imitation. Conversely, when a 
link in the value system comprises a large 
number of business entities, a firm is unlikely 
to ef fectively reach a critical mass of entities 
and raise substantial barriers to imitation in 
the same amount of time. 
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in place, the innovating firm should use this 
question to help estimate the magnitude of the 
preemption barrier to erosion. The fact is that 
being second sometimes means being left behind. 
Exploiting the characteristics of the innovation 
and the industry in which they compete, inno-
vators can sometimes preempt any meaningful 
response by competitors. A case study that brings 
home this insight is offered by eBay. As I hinted 
above, imitation of eBay’s IT-dependent strategic 
initiative by two formidable competitors, namely, 
Amazon.com and Yahoo!, could not diminish 
eBay’s dominance, even as it steadily raises its 
prices and continues to appropriate a substantial 
portion of the value it has created. The reason 
is to be found in the strong network effects that 
characterize the online auction market. The 
dominant player will be the one that first reaches 
critical mass (in this case, eBay). Being second 
in the online auction market does not count!15 
Even when outright preemption is not pos-
sible, the attentive innovator often has the ability 
to create substantial obstacles for any prospec-
tive imitator by levying switching costs at the 
appropriate stage in the value system. Preemption 
is strongest when the firm can identify a link in 
the value system where few customers or partners 
(e.g., suppliers) exist, and the partners that do 
exist place a premium on having an exclusive 
relationship with a firm. In this scenario, they 
may eventually sever their relationship with the 
firm and do business with a competitor, but they 
won’t trade with both at the same time. For ex-
ample, if a five-unit restaurant operation wants 
chain-wide forecasts and historical analyses of 
trends, such as those offered by business intelli-
gence-data consolidators like Avero Inc., all five 
units must use Avero’s software. From Avero’s 
standpoint, customers (in this case, the five res-
taurants) place a premium on an exclusive rela-
tionship. They will all do business with Avero, 
or they all will switch to a competitor, but they 
will not work with two vendors at the same time.
When such conditions are present or can be 
created, switching costs have the most power in 
raising the preemption barrier. When switching 
costs are high, competitors must indemnify any 
newly won customers for the cost of switching. 
As I put it above, competitors must be that much 
better than the leader, where that much is deter-
mined by the magnitude of the switching costs. 
The set of three questions offered above 
should provide the innovator (or any follower 
who is using this analysis as a diagnostic tool 
to study the leader’s IT-dependent strategic 
initiative) with an idea of how defendable its 
initiative is and what are the available options 
to improve its barriers to erosion. No initiative 
is static, though, and barriers to erosion decay 
over time as competition runs its course. As a 
consequence, managers should ask the folowign 
question to complete the analysis.
(4) What evolutionary paths does the innovation 
create? Sheltered by its lead time, the innovator 
can and should seek ways to reinforce its barriers 
to erosion. Based on their understanding of the 
organizational learning and asset-stock-accu-
mulation processes described before, the leading 
firm’s managers can chart an evolutionary path 
for the initiative. While the evolutionary paths 
thus identified must be revised as the situation 
changes, this analysis can highlight important 
response-lag drivers that can be strengthened 
over time. Performing this analysis will also 
ensure that the evolution of the initiative is in-
tentional rather than haphazard and minimizes 
the likelihood that opportunities will be missed.
Consider for example the case of CRM in 
modern hotels. Because of the nature of the 
lodging service, where guests often volunteer 
preference and personal information, many 
hotels have assembled vast databases of guests’ 
needs and likes. Yet until recently the value 
The analysis might show that it’s wise to go ahead with the IT-
dependent initiative 
 (1) independently, (2) in an 
industry consortium, or (3) not at 
all—if the barriers to imitation are 
insufficient.
15 Interestingly, the eBay example shows that using propri-
etary IT is not a necessary condition for superior long-term 
performance. 
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Note that the determination of whether the 
technology at the core of the initiative should 
be developed in a proprietary manner will de-
pend on the role that the response lags associ-
ated with it (i.e., the IT Project Barrier) play in 
the sustainability of the advantage. 
(2) Develop the IT-dependent strategic 
initiative as part of a consortium. When the 
initiative is unlikely to yield sustainable com-
petitive advantage for the innovator, but, even 
after replication by competitors, it will improve 
the overall profitability of the industry, the firm 
should attempt to create a joint venture with 
competitors or engage them in a consortium. 
THISCO, the reservation switch, represents an early 
and rare example of this type of development by 
competitors in the hospitality industry. In this 
scenario, the leader should strive to minimize 
costs and risks associated with the initiative and 
share them with competitors since all will benefit.
(3) Shelve the IT-dependent strategic initia-
tive. When the analysis suggests that the initia-
tive will not offer strong barriers to erosion, and 
retaliation by competitors will degrade the aver-
age profitability of the industry (e.g., any value 
created is driven to customers by competition), 
the firm should shelve the proposed initiative. 
If the firm does go ahead with the initiative the 
likely outcome is competitors’ imitation and 
the creation of value that will be appropriated 
by customers. For these types of initiatives, the 
firm should refrain from being the innovator 
and instead plan to follow only when strictly 
necessary.16 
of guest data for analyses (such as customer 
lifetime-value analysis) was not recognized by 
managers (cynics may suggest that it still largely 
isn’t). A careful analysis of guest-reward initia-
tives may have shown that the substantial in-
formation repositories which accumulated as a 
byproduct of the initiative are subject to asset-
stock accumulation. Thus, the firm that collects 
these data in useable form has a strong basis 
for sustainability in future strategies that use it.
Conclusion
The framework provided here should prove 
useful to hospitality managers in supporting a 
careful analysis of IT-dependent strategic initia-
tives. Since it is difficult to find guidelines for 
any but a simplistic analysis of the strategic role 
of IT, I hope that this report will offer a start-
ing point. Even though these guidelines are a 
simplification of reality, as is true of any frame-
work, I believe that when used by a talented 
and attentive manager, they can provide useful 
insights. On the basis of those insights, man-
agers are best positioned to decide whether to 
go forward with a proposed initiative or shelve 
it for future reevaluation. The following are 
three possible broad outcomes from the analysis:
(1) Develop the IT-dependent strategic ini-
tiative independently. Independent development 
is warranted if the analysis suggests that strong 
barriers to erosion exist and the firm foresees the 
ability to appropriate the value created by the 
initiative over the long term (i.e., sustainable ad-
vantage can be attained). Independent develop-
ment is also warranted if the leader can reap an 
acceptable return on its innovation, even though 
the analysis shows that competitors will eventu-
ally be able to overcome the barriers to erosion.
16 Because of the fast-declining costs of IT and IT imple-
mentations, being a follower with non-sustainable innova-
tions enables the firm to replicate the leader’s initiative at 
a much lower cost.
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